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To learn more about the effect of economic conditions on 
civil war, we examine whether Sub-Saharan civil wars are 
more likely to start following downturns in the international 
price of countries’ main export commodities. The data show 
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in their main OECD export destinations. 
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1. Introduction 
Since 1945, civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa have led to more than 4 million battle deaths 
(Sarkees, 2000) and probably many more civilian casualties (Eck and Hultman, 2007). What 
started these wars? The debate has focused on ethnic divisions, fragile institutions, and 
economic conditions (World Bank, 2003). But precise answers remain difficult. This is 
especially evident when it comes to the question whether civil wars are partly caused by 
economic conditions. For example, it is well known that Sub-Saharan Africa has seen many 
civil wars and poor economic growth by international comparisons (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa, 1999; World Bank, 2003). Also, countries with an 
especially bad growth record in the region have had more civil wars. But this does not prove 
that civil wars are started by worsening economic conditions because civil wars and poor 
economic growth might be caused by the same factors (Acemoglu, 2005). Moreover, most 
factors raising the chances of civil war will lower investment and aggregate GDP, and 
economic conditions may therefore be the result—rather than cause—of civil war in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
  To learn more about the effect of economic conditions on Sub-Saharan African civil 
wars, we examine whether civil wars are more likely to start following downturns in the 
international price of countries’ main exports commodities. That commodity price 
downturns cause rapidly worsening economic conditions in many Sub-Saharan African 
economies has been shown by Deaton and Miller (1995) and Deaton (1999). But do 
commodity price downturns also lead to the outbreak of civil wars? A preliminary piece of 
evidence comes from Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, the three Sub-Saharan African 
countries most dependent on coffee exports. After the international coffee price dropped by 
over 50 percent between 1997 and 2000, civil wars broke out in Burundi in 2000, in Rwanda 
in 2001, and in Uganda in 2002. This was not the first time that civil wars in these countries 
were preceded by drops in international coffee prices. The 1991 civil wars in Rwanda and 
Uganda began after a 40 percent fall in coffee prices between 1988 and 1991. 
  The evidence from Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda alone is not conclusive as politics and 
geography may have made civil war especially likely (Herbst, 2000; Diamond, 2005;   2
Kamola, 2007; Robins, 2008).
1 We therefore use data on the international prices of a wide 
range of commodities from the IMF and UNCTAD to calculate fixed-weight export-price 
indices for 39 Sub-Saharan countries for the 1980-2006 period (IMF) and the 1960-2006 
period (UNCTAD). This allows us to ask whether Sub-Saharan African countries 
experiencing downturns in the international prices of their commodity exports were 
subsequently more likely to see civil wars. We find that downturns in international 
commodity prices did make civil war onset more likely, and that this result is robust to 
accounting for cross-country differences in the probability of civil war; for country-specific 
time trends; and for common shocks to the likelihood of civil war across Sub-Saharan 
Africa. For example, between 1981 and 2006, a 20 percent drop in countries’ export price 
indices raised the probability of civil war outbreak by around 2.8 percentage points. To put 
this into perspective, the “background” probability of a civil war outbreak in Sub-Saharan 
Africa over the 1981-2006 period was about 2.8 percent, and the probability of a drop in the 
export price index larger than 20 percent about 10 percent. Hence, there was approximately 
a 10 percent chance of a drop in export prices that increased the probability of a civil war by 
100 percent of the background probability. 
  Our baseline analysis presumes that international commodity prices do not reflect 
changes in the probability of future civil wars in Sub-Saharan African exporting countries. 
This condition would be violated if civil war risk had a significant effect on international 
commodity prices because of expected civil-war-related supply restrictions. But in this case 
civil wars in exporting countries should be more likely following rising commodity prices, 
while we find that civil wars are more likely following falling commodity prices. Also, it is 
straightforward to restrict the empirical analysis to commodities where Sub-Saharan African 
countries produce a small share of world supply (less than 3 percent). We find that our 
results continue to hold in this case. 
  Deaton and Miller (1995) and Deaton (1999) have shown that downturns in international 
commodity prices lead to lower economic growth in Sub-Saharan African exporting 
countries. Moreover, we find that per capita GDP growth of Sub-Saharan African countries 
                                                 
1 Also, all three countries depend on the same export commodity (coffee). Other examples of 
civil wars that broke out after declines in the price of countries’ main commodity export are 
Angola, where the civil war in 1998 followed a 25 percent drop in the price of oil, and 
Sudan, where the civil war in 1983 followed a 15 percent drop in the price of cotton.   3
also turns out to be strongly affected by GDP growth of their main OECD export 
destinations, even after accounting for international growth shocks (see Acemoglu et al., 
2008, for similar evidence in a wider sample). We can therefore estimate the effect of lower 
economic growth on the likelihood of civil war outbreak under the identifying restriction 
that international commodity prices and OECD growth affect civil war onset through 
aggregate GDP growth only (once we control for country-specific fixed effects, time trends, 
and common shocks). Formal tests of this identifying restriction yield that it cannot be 
rejected. 
  Our work aims to contribute to the literature on the link between economic conditions 
and civil war (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Sambanis, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 
2003; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Within this 
literature, we are closest to Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004). They examine the link 
between economic growth and civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa exploiting that economic 
growth in the region depends strongly on rainfall growth. An important difference between 
their approach and ours is that rainfall shocks are transitory, while international commodity 
prices revert to their mean only very slowly, if at all (see Cashin, Liang, and McDermott, 
2000).
2 Hence, economic downturns following falling commodity prices tend to be long 
lasting. An important difference between our empirical results and those of Miguel et al. is 
that rainfall growth does no longer explain civil war onset when we account for time-
varying factors that affect the probability of civil war throughout Sub-Saharan Africa; the 
effect of commodity price downturns on civil war onset, on the other hand, is robust to 
common economic, social, or political factors driving civil war onset in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
  Our paper is also related to the literature on the natural resource curse. One strand of this 
literature investigates whether abundant natural resources make civil war onset more likely, 
see for example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon (2005), Humphrey (2005), Ross 
(2006), De Soysa and Neumayer (2007), Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008). According to the 
latest evidence, there does not appear to be a robust link between natural resource wealth 
                                                 
2 This is also the case for the commodity prices in our sample. Using the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test, we cannot reject a unit root for any of the international price series in our sample.   4
and civil war.
3 Our analysis differs in that we focus on the within-country link between the 
value of primary production (due to fluctuation in international prices) and civil war 
outbreak.  
  There is an emerging literature on the link between civil conflict and commodity prices. 
Angrist and Kugler (2008) and Dube and Vargas (2008) present studies for Columbia. 
Angrist and Kugler find that Columbian municipalities that saw an increase in coca prices 
also experienced a surge in violence. Dube and Vargas find the same result for Columbian 
municipalities with oil, coal, or gold production following a rise in the international prices of 
these commodities. But when they consider agricultural commodities like coffee, sugar, 
bananas, and tobacco, they tend to find that higher international prices reduce violence.
4  
  Besley and Persson (2008) examine the effect of commodity export prices on civil war 
incidence and onset across a wide range of countries. Three main differences with our work 
are that Besley and Persson are interested in the effect of export prices conditional on 
income, that they focus on civil war incidence, and that their empirical analysis takes 
income as exogenous.
5 Assuming such exogeneity is difficult for the Sub-Saharan African 
countries we focus on as income growth is likely to respond to the risk of civil war. 
Estimating the effect of international commodity prices conditional on income growth 
therefore requires an instrument for growth. We take a step in this direction by exploiting 
that income growth across Sub-Saharan African countries is strongly related to GDP growth 
across OECD countries they export to. We find that international export prices do not affect 
civil war onset conditional on income growth, which is consistent with Besley and Persson’s 
result that export prices do not affect civil war onset once income is accounted for. 
    
 
                                                 
3 There is some evidence of a positive link between the abundance of certain exhaustible 
resources and civil war however. 
4 When we split commodities into exhaustible resources and agricultural commodities we 
find that higher international prices reduce the chances of civil war for both groups of 
commodities. The effect of agricultural commodities is statistically significant. Regarding 
the effect of natural resources, we can neither reject the hypothesis that the effect is identical 
to that of agricultural commodities nor the hypothesis that the effect is equal to zero. 
5 See also Frank (2006) who considers the link between commodity prices and civil war in a 
wide cross-section of countries between 1959 and 1997. He does not control for country 
fixed effects and common trends in civil war risk however.   5
 
2. Data and Measurement 
Civil conflict. Data on civil conflict is obtained from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts 
2007 Dataset of the International Peace Research Institute’s (PRIO) Centre for the Study of 
Civil War and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).
6 The UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Database defines civil conflict as a “contested incompatibility which concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at 
least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle deaths.”
7 The database 
records both incidence and onset of minor conflicts (25 to 999 battle-related deaths per year) 
as well as civil wars (at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year). While UCDP/PRIO does 
not provide information on the exact number of battle deaths, it indicates whether the 
conflict reached a cumulative death toll of more than 1000 battle deaths. In our sample none 
of the minor conflicts reached this cumulative death toll, which indicates that these are low-
intensity conflicts rather than large-scale intra-state wars. To capture civil war outbreak, we 
define a year t civil war onset indicator for country c that is unity if there is a civil war in t 
but not in t-1, and zero if there is no civil war in t and t-1; if there is a civil war in t-1, the 
year t civil war onset indicator is not defined. 
International commodity price growth. We construct an international commodity price 
index for each of the 39 Sub-Saharan African countries in our sample following Deaton 
(1999). The starting point is monthly international commodity price data for 19 commodities 
for the 1980-2006 period from the International Monetary Fund (2009). Averaging across all 
observations in a calendar year yields an annual price series for each commodity i, Pi,t (the 
1990 value is set equal to unity for all commodities).
8 We then obtain each country’s export 
share of these commodities from Deaton for 1990 and, for countries and commodities not 
covered by Deaton, from the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database for the year closest 
                                                 
6 The dataset is available at http://new.prio.no/CSCW-Datasets/Data-on-Armed-Conflict.  
7 See www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict or www.pcr.uu.se for more on the definition and coding of 
civil conflicts. 
8 The commodities are: aluminium, bananas, cocoa, coffee, copper, cotton, fish, gold, 
groundnuts, iron, livestock, nickel, oil, phosphates, sugar, tea, tobacco, wood, uranium. The 
data comes from http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/externaldata.csv.    6
to 1990 (commodities and years are listed in the Appendix Table). This allows us to 







=∑ , where 
, ci ω  is the time-invariant export share of commodity i in country c.
9 The annual growth rates 
of the commodity price index are our main explanatory variables. The IMF commodity price 
data starts in 1980. To present results for a longer time period we also use United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (2009) data. 
Export-weighted OECD growth. We construct an export-weighted GDP growth rate of 
OECD trading partners for each of the Sub-Saharan African countries in our sample. For 
Sub-Saharan countries c and year t, the export-weighted GDP growth rate of OECD trading 







=∑ , where θc,j is the (time-invariant) exports 
of country c to country j as a share of country c’s GDP in 1990 and  , jt GDPGrowth  the GDP 
growth rate of OECD countries j in constant US$.
10 The GDP data come from the World 
Development Indicators (2009) and the export data from the OECD Statistics (2009).
11 This 
variable is closely related to Acemoglu et al.’s (2008) trade-weighted world income 
instrument.  
Rainfall growth. Our data on rainfall growth covers the 1979-2006 period and comes from 
the NASA Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP), Version 2 (Adler et. al, 
2003).
12 The rainfall data is that of Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) but covers a 
longer time period. The GPCP rainfall data are based on data from satellites and rain gauges. 
Alternative rainfall data sets are based on rain gauges only, which has the disadvantage that 
gauge coverage in many Sub-Saharan African countries is very sparse and that the number 
of reporting stations may be affected by socio-economic conditions. 
Income growth. Data for real GDP per capita growth are taken from the Penn World Tables 
6.2 for the 1961-2004 period (the data stops in 2004) and from the World Development 
                                                 
9 The commodities and weights used for each country are listed in the Appendix Table. 
10 We use GDP in constant US$ to capture international purchasing power. 
11 Available at http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx. 
12 The data comes from http://precip.gsfc.nasa.gov.   7
Indicators (2009) for the 2004-2006 period.
13 Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of 
our data. 
 
3. Estimation Framework 
Our main estimating equation links the indicator for civil war onset to commodity price 
growth and other controls, 
 
(1)     ct c c t ct ct ConflictOnset t ComPriceGrowth α βδ γ ε = ++ + + , 
 
where  ct ComPriceGrowth  is the growth rate of international commodity prices over the 
three years leading up to t (we also estimate separate effects for annual growth rates). Our 
estimates account for country fixed effects ( c α ), country-specific trends ( ct β ), and shocks 
that are common to Sub-Saharan African countries ( t δ ). ct ε  is a disturbance term that can be 
serially correlated. 
  In addition to (1), we also estimate an equation with GDP growth instead of 
commodity price growth on the right-hand-side. Our main method of estimation is two-stage 
least squares with commodity price growth as an instrument for GDP growth. Notice that 
linear two-stage least squares is the preferred method of estimation despite the dichotomous 
explanatory variable, as alternative approaches require strong specification assumptions 
(Angrist and Krueger, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
International commodity prices and civil war onset. Table 2 contains our results on the 
effect of international commodity prices on civil war onset. In column (1) we link civil war 
onset in year t to the growth of international commodity prices over the 3 previous years, 
controlling for country fixed effects, country-specific time trends and year fixed effects (we 
                                                 
13 The WDI data start in 1980 but are unavailable for two of the countries in our sample. 
Combining data allows us to work with all countries in our sample and go up to 2006. We 
would still get significant first-stage and second-stage estimates however if we used the 
PWT or WDI data only.   8
stop at 3 lags as additional lags are never significant). The estimates show that the risk of 
civil war outbreak is higher when the price of export commodities drops. The statistically 
significant effects at t and t-2 imply that a 20 percent drop in countries’ commodity price 
indices is associated with an increase in the probability of a civil war onset of about 1.1 
percentage points on impact (this number is the estimate in Table 2 column (1) in the paper 
multiplied by 0.20) and an additional 1.7 percentage points with a lag. Summing the effect 
on impact and the lagged effect yields a total increase in the probability of civil war of 2.8 
percentage points. To put this into perspective, the “background” probability of a civil war 
outbreak in Sub-Saharan Africa over the 1981-2006 period is 2.8 percent. Hence, a 20 
percent drop in countries’ commodity price index raises the probability of civil war by 100 
percent of the background probability. As 10 percent of our observations show a drop of the 
commodity price index larger than 20 percent, the data indicate a 10 percent chance of a 
drop in export prices that increases the probability of a civil war onset by 100 percent of the 
background probability. 
  In column (2), we look at the link between rainfall growth and civil war onset. We do 
not find any significant effects, which contrasts with Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 
(2004). The difference arises because Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti do not control for 
common Sub-Saharan African risk factors.
14 In column (3) we show that the significant 
effect of international commodity price growth remains statistically significant when 
controlling for rainfall growth which continues to be insignificant. Column (4) shows that 
this is also the case when using the level of rainfall rather than the growth rate.
15  
  In column (5) we relate civil war onset in year t to the growth of countries’ commodity 
price indices over the 3 previous years. This specification yields that a 25 percent drop in the 
international commodity price index over a 3-year period raises the probability of civil war 
onset by about 1.5 percentage points—50 percent of the background probability of civil war 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (10 percent of the observations have 3-year drops in excess of 25 
                                                 
14 We find that year effects are always jointly significant at the 1 percent level at least. 
15 Ciccone (2008) argues that interannual rainfall growth is not the right variable to examine 
whether negative rainfall shocks make civil war outbreak more likely. This is because 
rainfall shocks are transitory, which implies that rainfall growth may be low either because 
of a negative rainfall shock or because of mean reversion following a positive shock.   9
percent).
16 Column (6) controls for average rainfall levels over the 3 previous years and 
finds that 3-year commodity price growth continues to have a significant negative effect on 
civil war onset while 3-year rainfall is insignificant.
17  
  Table 3 looks at the effect of 3-year commodity price growth on civil war outbreak using 
a variety of limited dependent variable estimators. Not all of them allow for fixed effects, 
which is why some of the models estimated in the table do not include controls. For 
comparison with the limited dependent variable estimates without controls, we report least-
squares estimates without controls in column (1). Column (2) reports the marginal effect in 
the corresponding probit model (probit is inconsistent with fixed effects, see Wooldridge, 
2002). It can be seen that the probit result is similar to the least-squares result in column (1). 
In column (3) we use a logit model without controls and find a marginal effect that is 
identical to the probit model in column (2). Column (4) reports the non-marginal effect of 
the logit model for comparison with the rare-events logit estimator of King and Zeng (2001) 
in column (5). King and Zeng argue that their estimator is preferable when the outcome of 
interest is a rare event as logit can be biased upwards in this case (the average probability of 
a civil war onset during 1980-2006 period is 2.8 percent). Our results show that this does not 
appear to be a concern in our application.
18 
  Our most important limited dependent variable results are the conditional fixed effects 
logit estimates in columns (6) and (7). These estimates have the advantage of being 
consistent in the presence of fixed effects, see Wooldridge (2002). This approach yields 
statistically significant effects of 3-year commodity price growth on civil war outbreak 
whether we control for country fixed effects only (column (6)) or country fixed effects as 
                                                 
16 We have tested whether the impact of negative price shocks is different from the impact of 
positive price shocks by including in the regression an interaction term between the 3-year 
commodity price growth rate and an indicator function that is 1 if and only if 3-year 
commodity price growth is strictly negative. We find that this interaction term is 
insignificant while the linear effect on the commodity price growth rate remains significant. 
Hence, we do not find evidence that the impact of negative price shocks is significantly 
different from the impact of positive price shocks.  
17 We would obtain the same result if we controlled for 3-year rainfall growth. 
18 We have also done a Monte-Carlo study simulating time-series data that matches the 
average rate of civil war outbreak and our sample size to ensure that the rare-events nature 
of civil war onsets does not bias inference. We find that we correctly rejected the null 
hypothesis of no significant effect at the right rate for the 1 percent level, the 5 percent level, 
as well as the 10 percent level.   10
well as country-specific time trends and year fixed effects (column (7)).
19 It is also important 
to note that the logit effect is strongest quantitatively and statistically in column (7) where 
we account for all controls (see columns (4) and (6) for comparison). Hence, to isolate the 
effect of commodity prices on civil war, it is important to control for country-specific time 
trends as well as common shocks. 
Economic growth and civil war onset. Table 4 examines the link between Sub-Saharan 
economic growth and the outbreak of civil war. The table shows least-squares results and 
two-stage least-squares estimates using commodity price index growth as an instrument for 
economic growth. Column (1) estimates the first-stage relation between 3-year commodity 
price growth and GDP per capita growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, controlling for country 
fixed effects (which capture country-specific differences in steady state growth rates), 
country-specific time trends (capturing convergence effects), and year fixed effects (which 
capture the world business cycle and other shocks that are common to Sub-Saharan African 
countries). The main finding is that falling international commodity prices reduce economic 
growth rates, which is in line with Deaton and Miller (1995) and Deaton (1999). The point 
estimate implies that a 25 percent drop in countries’ commodity price indices over a 3-year 
period reduces real per capita GDP growth by 0.7 percentage points. This effect is highly 
statistically significant (the t-statistic is 3.97). 
  Column (2) contains the least-squares effect of GDP per capita growth on civil war 
onset. The point estimate is negative and significant at the 95 percent confidence level. This 
cannot be taken as evidence of a causal effect of per capita GDP growth on civil war risk 
however for several reasons. For example, the least-squares effect may overstate the causal 
effect because a greater likelihood of civil war may reduce investment and future economic 
growth. But it is also possible that the causal effect is understated because of classical 
measurement error bias (measurement error is known to be particularly severe in Sub-
Saharan African national account statistics, see Heston, 1994, and Deaton, 2005). 
  Column (3) presents instrumental-variables (two-stage least-squares) estimates of the 
effect of GDP per capita growth on civil war risk. We find that a 1 percent drop in GDP 
                                                 
19 Note that coefficients do not represent marginal effects since this would require 
knowledge of the distribution of the fixed effects (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 492).  
   11
increases the risk of civil war onset by over 2 percentage points (controlling for country 
fixed effects, country-specific time trends, and year fixed effects). This estimate is 
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level and, in absolute value, more than 5 
times the least-squares effect in column (2).
20 
  It turns out that per capita GDP growth of Sub-Saharan African countries is also strongly 
affected by GDP growth of their main OECD export destinations. This can be seen in Table 
5, column (1), where higher OECD growth has a positive and highly statistically significant 
effect on Sub-Saharan per capita GDP growth, even after controlling for country fixed 
effects, country time trends, and year effects. (Moreover, as shown in column (2), higher 
OECD growth also lowers the likelihood of civil war onset.) This motivates our two-stage 
least-squares analysis in column (3), which uses both commodity price growth and OECD 
growth as an instrument for Sub-Saharan African GDP per capita growth. The result in 
column (3) shows that this also yields a statistically significant, negative effect of GDP 
growth on the probability of civil war outbreak. Compared to column (3), the effect is 
statistically stronger but smaller in absolute value. Most importantly, according to the test of 
overidentifying restrictions reported in the table, the exclusion restriction cannot be rejected 
at standard confidence levels.
21 
  Table 6 repeats the empirical analysis for the onset of civil conflict. Civil conflict 
includes both events classified as civil wars and (relatively) minor conflicts. In column (1) 
we report first-stage effects for this sample, which turn out to be highly statistically 
significant. In column (2) we find that both commodity price growth and OECD growth 
have a negative reduced-form effect on civil conflict onset, but that only OECD growth is 
statistically significant. Column (3) reports the least-squares effect of GDP growth on civil 
conflict onset and column (4) the two-stage least-squares estimate. According to the two-
stage least-squares estimate a 1 percent decrease in per capita GDP implies an increase in 
                                                 
20 We have also done the second stage regression controlling for a time-varying measure of 
export diversification which we construct from the NBER UN Trade statistics database. We 
find that per capita GDP growth continues to show up in the second stage as having a 
statistically significant, negative effect on civil war onset. Annual changes in export 
diversification, on the other hand, turn out to be statistically insignificant. 
21 We have also examined whether international commodity price shocks could affect civil 
war onset through their effect on government (military) expenditures or foreign aid but did 
not find any significant effects. 
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the probability of civil conflict outbreak of more than 0.6 percentage points, which is about 
twice the least-squares effect in absolute value. 
  In Table 7 we examine the link between commodity prices, economic growth, and civil 
war/conflict for the 1961-2006 period using UNCTAD commodity price data. Panel A 
shows estimates for civil war onset and Panel B estimates for the onset of civil conflict. The 
effect of international commodity price growth is negative and statistically significant in 
both cases. We also find a statistically significant negative effect of OECD export demand 
growth on civil war and civil conflict onset. In columns (3) and (4) we estimate the effect of 
GDP per capita growth on civil war/conflict outbreak using a least-squares approach and an 
instrumental-variables approach respectively. Both approaches yield a statistically 
significant, negative effect of economic growth on civil war/conflict onset, and instrumental-
variables estimates are more than twice the corresponding least-squares estimates in absolute 
value. Moreover, the instrumental-variables effects in Table 7 are similar to those in Tables 
5 and 6 (smaller for civil war onset and slightly larger for civil conflict onset). Hence, our 
estimates for the 1961-2006 period continue to indicate a link between the outbreak of civil 
war/conflict and economic shocks related to international commodity prices and OECD 
demand for Sub-Saharan African exports. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our goal has been to learn more about the effect of economic conditions on civil war 
outbreak. To do so, we examined whether civil wars were more likely following exogenous 
downturns in international prices of and demand for Sub-Saharan African countries’ main 
export commodities. Our empirical results indicate that negative shocks did make civil war 
more likely. For example, between 1981 and 2006, a 20 percent year-to-year drop in 
countries’ export price indices raised the probability of civil war outbreak by around 2.8 
percentage points. To put this into perspective, the “background” probability of a civil war 
outbreak in Sub-Saharan Africa over this period was about 2.8 percent, and the probability 
of a drop in the export price index larger than 20 percent about 10 percent. Hence, there was 
approximately a 10 percent chance of a drop in export prices that increased the probability 
of a civil war by 100 percent of the background probability.   13
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Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Civil War Onset 1981-2006 (PRIO/UPSALLA 2007) 0.028 0.166 814
Civil Conflict Onset 1981-2006 (PRIO/UPSALLA 2007) 0.055 0.228 688
Civil War Onset 1961-2006 (PRIO/UPSALLA 2007) 0.021 0.144 1332
Civil Conflict Onset 1961-2006 (PRIO/UPSALLA 2007) 0.052 0.223 1150
International Commodity Price Growth, Index (IMF) 0.059 0.356 914
International Commodity Price Growth, Index (UNCTAD) 0.186 0.509 1444
Rainfall Growth, Adler et al. (2003) 0.022 0.218 914
OECD GDP Growth 1981-2006, WDI (2009) and OECD (2009) 2.335 6.608 914
OECD GDP Growth 1961-2006, WDI (2009) and OECD (2009) 2.517 6.693 1444
Real Per Capita GDP Growth 1981-2006 (PWT 6.2 and WDI (2009)) 0.028 0.089 914
Real Per Capita GDP Growth 1961-2006 (PWT 6.2 and WDI (2009)) 0.006 0.088 1444
15Table 2. Commodity Price Shocks and Civil War Onset 1981-2006
Civil War Onset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LS LS LS LS LS LS




































Log Rainfall, t -0.031
(-0.93)
Log Rainfall, t-1 -0.047
(-1.60)




Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.270 0.262 0.271 0.273 0.271 0.272
MSE 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.141 0.142 0.141
Observations 814 814 814 814 814 814
Note: Method of estimation is least squares; t-values reported in parentheses are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the 
country level.  The dependent variable is civil war onset.  3-Year Commodity Price Growth is the commodity price growth rate between t and t-3 
using international commodity price data from IMF.  3-Year Rainfall is the log of the average amount of rainfall over the past 3 years.  * Significantly 
different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level, ** 95 percent confidence level, *** 99 percent confidence level. 
16Table 3. Limited Dependent Variable Estimates
Civil War Onset


































Country FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Time Trends No No No No No No Yes
Year FE No No No No No No Yes
Observations 814 814 814 814 814 814 814
Note: The method of estimation in column (1) is least squares; in columns (2)-(7) maximum likelihood.  Column (2) reports marginal effects 
estimates from a probit model; column (3) reports marginal effects estimates from a logit model; column (4) reports non-marginal effects estimates 
from a logit model; column (5) reports non-marginal effects estimates using the rare-events logit estimator (King and Zeng, 2001); columns (6) and 
(7) report non-marginal effects estimates from a conditional logit fixed effects regression.  The dependent variable is civil war onset.   3-Year 
Commodity Price Growth is the commodity price growth rate between t and t-3, using international commodity price data from IMF.  *Significantly 
different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level, ** 95 percent confidence level, *** 99 percent confidence level. 
Table 4. Economic Growth and Civil War Onset 1981-2006











Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.159 0.293 .
MSE 0.243 0.313 0.195
Observations 814 814 814
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(2) is least squares, column (3) two-stage least squares; below the least squares estimates we report t-
values (in brackets) based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level; below the two-stage least squares estimates we 
report p-values [in square brackets] based on the Anderson-Rubin test of statistical significance. A key property of this test is that it is robust to weak 
instruments; 2SLS standard errors are not robust to weak instruments, and inference based on 2SLS can be very misleading as a result. See Andrews 
and Stock (2005) for a review of these issues. We implement a version of the Anderson-Rubin test that is robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
within-county correlation of the residuals. The dependent variable in column (1) is per capita GDP growth, columns (2)-(3) civil war onset.  3-Year 
Commodity Price Growth  is the commodity price growth rate between  t  and  t-3, using international commodity price data from IMF.   The 
instrumental variable in column (3) is the commodity price growth rate between t and t-3.   *Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent 
confidence level, ** 95 percent confidence level, *** 99 percent confidence level.    
17Table 5. Export Demand, Economic Growth, and Civil War Onset 1981-2006













Per Capita GDP Growth -0.813***
[0.000]
Hansen J, p-value 0.1410
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.214 0.276 .
MSE 0.077 0.141 0.144
Observations 814 814 814
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(2) is least squares, column (3) two-stage least squares; below the least squares estimates we report t-
values (in brackets) based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level; below the two-stage least squares estimates of the 
endogenous variable we report p-values [in square brackets] based on the Anderson-Rubin test of statistical significance. A key property of this test is 
that it is robust to weak instruments; 2SLS standard errors are not robust to weak instruments, and inference based on 2SLS can be very misleading as 
a result. See Andrews and Stock (2005) for a review of these issues. We implement a version of the Anderson-Rubin test that is robust to 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-county correlation of the residuals. The dependent variable in column (1) is per capita GDP growth, columns 
(2)-(3) civil war onset.  3-Year Commodity Price Growth is the commodity price growth rate between t and t-3, using international commodity price 
data from IMF.  The instrumental variable in column (3) is the commodity price growth rate between t and t-3 and OECD growth  *Significantly 
different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level, ** 95 percent confidence level, *** 99 percent confidence level.    
18Table 6. Economic Growth and Civil Conflict Onset 1981-2006
                                GDP Growth                                            Civil Conflict Onset                   
(1) (2) (3) (4)















Hansen J, p-value 0.5338
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.274 0.285 0.291 .
MSE 0.068 0.193 0.192 0.194
Observations 688 688 688 688
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(3) is least squares, column (4) two-stage least squares; below the least squares estimates we report t-
values (in brackets) based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level; below the two-stage least squares estimates we 
report p-values [in square brackets] based on the Anderson-Rubin test of statistical significance. A key property of this test is that it is robust to weak 
instruments; 2SLS standard errors are not robust to weak instruments, and inference based on 2SLS can be very misleading as a result. See Andrews 
and Stock (2005) for a review of these issues. We implement a version of the Anderson-Rubin test that is robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
within-county correlation of the residuals. The dependent variable in column (1) is per capita GDP growth, columns (2)-(4) civil conflict onset.  3-
Year Commodity Price Growth is the commodity price growth rate between t and t-3, using international commodity price data from IMF.  The 
instrumental variable in column (4) is the commodity price growth rate between t and t-3 and OECD growth.  *Significantly different from zero at the 
90 percent confidence level, ** 95 percent confidence level, *** 99 percent confidence level.    
19Table 7. Commodity Price Shocks, Export Demand, Growth, and Civil War Onset 1961-2006
                        GDP Growth                                                Civil War Onset                         
Panel A: Civil War Onset
(1) (2) (3) (4)















Hansen J, p-value 0.6333
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.140 0.153 0.165 .
MSE 0.081 0.132 0.131 0.134
Observations 1332 1332 1332 1332
Panel B: Civil Conflict Onset
(1) (2) (3) (4)















Hansen J, p-value 0.4794
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.185 0.232 0.233 .
MSE 0.076 0.195 0.195 0.198
Observations 1150 1150 1150 1150
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(3) is least squares, column (4) two-stage least squares; below the least squares estimates we report t-
values (in brackets) based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level; below the two-stage least squares estimates we 
report p-values [in square brackets] based on the Anderson-Rubin test of statistical significance. A key property of this test is that it is robust to weak 
instruments; 2SLS standard errors are not robust to weak instruments, and inference based on 2SLS can be very misleading as a result. See Andrews 
and Stock (2005) for a review of these issues. We implement a version of the Anderson-Rubin test that is robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
within-county correlation of the residuals. The dependent variable in column (1) is per capita GDP growth; Panel A, columns (2)-(4) civil war onset 
and Panel B, columns (2)-(4) civil conflict onset.  3-Year Commodity Price Growth is the commodity price growth rate between t and t-3, using 
international commodity price data from UNCTAD.  The instrumental variable in column (4) is the commodity price growth rate between t and t-3 
and OECD growth  *Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level, ** 95 percent confidence level, *** 99 percent confidence 
level.    
20Appendix Table 1. Commodity Exports of Sub-Saharan Countries  
Country Commodities
Angola Oil (93)
Benin Cotton (42), Oil (22)
Botswana Nickel  (10), Copper (6)* [2000]
Burkina Faso Cotton (57), Gold (20)
Burundi Coffee (75), Tea (10)
Cameroon Oil (50), Wood (9)*, Cocoa (8)*+, Aluminium (7)*, Coffee (8)*, Cotton (3)* [1990]
Central African Republic  Coffee (11), Wood (19)*, Cotton (11)*, Tobacco (1)* [1993]
Chad Cotton (85)
Democratic Republic of Congo Copper (46), Oil (10)
Republic of Congo Oil (85)
Ethiopia Coffee (45), Sugar (2)* [1993]
Gabon Oil (75), Wood (11)
Gambia Groundnuts (20), Fish (32), Cotton (3)
Ghana Cocoa (29)+,  Aluminium (18), Gold (13), Wood (11), 
Guinea Aluminium (64)*, Coffee (6)*, Gold (2)*, Cotton (1)* [1995]
Guinea-Bissau Oil (14), Fish (28), Banana (50)*, Wood (4)*, Cotton (2)* [1995]
Ivory-Coast Cocoa (33)+ , Wood (16), Coffee (9)*, Oil (9)* [1995]
Kenya Tea (19)+, Oil (13), Coffee (14), Fish(2)* [1990]
Liberia Iron (62)*, Coffee (6)*, Cocoa (3)* [1984]
Madagascar Coffee (13), Fish (14), Sugar (7)*, Cotton (4)*, Oil* (1) [1990]
Malawi Tobacco (68), Tea (11)
Mali Cotton (62)
Mauritania Iron (55), Fish (35)
Mozambique Fish (36), Cotton (8)*, Sugar (7)* [1994]
Namibia Fish (18)*, Uranium (2)*+,  Gold (2) *, Copper (1)* [2000]
Niger Uranium (83)+
Nigeria Oil (93)+
Rwanda Coffee (61), Gold (20)
Senegal Oil (12), Groundnuts (17), Fish (28), Phosphates (6)*, Cotton (1)* [1990]
Sierra Leone Aluminium (19), Cocoa (15)*, Coffee (4)*, Fish (1)* [1984]
Somalia Livestock (90)* [1982]
South Africa Gold (50)*+, Iron (36)*, Aluminium (15)* [2000]
Sudan Cotton (42), Sugar (6)* [1990]
Swaziland Sugar (22), Cotton (2)* [1990]
Tanzania Cotton (18), Coffee (19), Sugar (13), Gold (5)
Togo Cotton (21), Phosphates (44)
Uganda Coffee (74)
Zambia Copper (88)
Zimbabwe Tobacco (24)+, Iron (10)*, Cotton (6)*, Copper (2)* [1990]
Note: The data comes predominantly from Deaton (1999) and refers to 1990.  When listed commodities comprised less than two thirds of total 
exports according to the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, we added commodities using data for the year (indicated in brackets) 
closest to 1990.  Commodity data added to Deaton is marked by an *.  Commodities produced in a country that constitute more than 3% of the world 
commodity supply are marked by a + (based on the information provided by the US Government International Energy Statistics (oil), International 
Cocoa Association (cocoa), International Coffee Association (coffee), FAO (tea), WHO (tobacco), World Gold Council (gold), and World Nuclear 
Association (uranium)).  
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